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A court of equity has no jurisdiction of a suit to restrain respondents
from publishing a biography of complainant or a member of complainants' family, where such person is a public character, e. g., one who
holds himself out as an inventor, and whose reputation as such becomes
world-wide.

This was a suit by the widow and children of G. H. Corliss,
to enjoin the publication and sale of a biographical sketch of
the deceased. Judge Colt placed his opinion upon two
grounds. He maintained that the foundation of the jurisdiction of a court of equity is civil property, and that, therefore,
such court has no jurisdiction to restrain even defamatory
publications, and still less, such publications as that in the
present case, which was not even stiggested to be libelous, or
even untrue.
To quote from the opinion:
"The bill does not allege that the publication contains anything scandalous, libelous or false, or that it affects any right
of property, but the relief prayed for is put upon the novel
ground that such publication is an injury to the feelings of the
plaintiffs and against their express prohibition. The counsel
for plaintiffs put their case upon the ground that Mr. Corliss
was a private character, and that the publication of his life is
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an invasion of the right of privacy, which a court of equity
should protect. .

.

. I cannot assent that Mr. Corliss was a

private character. He held himself out to the public as an
inventor, and his reputation became world-wide. He was a
public man, in the same sense as authors or artists are public
men. It would be a remarkable exception to the liberty of
the press if the lives of great inventors could not be given to
the public without their consent while living, or the approval
of their family when dead. But whether Mr. Corliss is to be
regarded as a private or public character (a distinction often
difficult to define) is not important in this case. Freedom of
speech and of the press is secured by the Constitution of the
United" States and the constitutions of most of the States.
This constitutional privilege implies a right to freely utter and
publish whatever the citizen may please, and to be protected
from any responsibility for so doing, except so far as such
publication, by reason of its blasphemy, obscenity or scandalous character, may be a public offence, or by its falsehood and
malice, may injuriously affect the standing, reputation or
pecuniary interests of individuals : Cooley on Constit. Law
(6 Ed.), 578. In other words, under our laws, one can speak
or publish what he desires, provided he commits no offence
against public morals or private reputation."
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"Four years ago, in an article entitled "The Right
to
Privacy," in 4 HarvardLaw Reviev, 193, this entire subject
-was very admirably and exhaustively discussed.
The view there advanced, and ably maintained, was that the
right to privacy is a legal right, distinct from the rights of
property and of reputation; and that this right should be
enforced by the courts, either in an action for damages, or, in a
proper case, by an injunction to prevent the publication of anything which unjustifiably intrudes upon privacy.
This article leaves little to be said, and it is here proposed
only to consider the cases which have been decided since it
was written, presenting, as they' do, -a difficulty not discussed
in the article, a new stumbling block in the way of the enforce-
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ment of this right by injunction, namely, the constitutional
provision for the "freedom of the press."
The reasoning of the above-mentioned article has received
judicial approbation in two New York cases.
Schu,ler v. Culrtis, 30 Abb. N. C. 376; 24 N. Y. Supp. 512
(1893), was a case where an injunction was granted, at the
suit of the near relatives of a deceased person, to restrain the
erection and exhibition of a statue of the deceased, it being
established that the exhibition would cause the complainants
pain and distress. The injunction was granted because the
injury was permanent or continuing in its nature, and, unlike
a libel, it would be impossible to ascertain the damage which
might be caused.
In other words, the court of equity intervened, because
otherwise the complainants would have been left without any
remedy.
In 31arks v. Jaffa, 26 N. Y. S. 908, (1893), the principle
was extended to the granting of an injunction against the
publication of a picture of the plaintiff in a newspaper, with
an invitation to readers of the paper to vote upon the question
of the popularity of plaintiff as compared with another person,
whose picture was also published.
The court there referred expressly to the article in the
Harvard Law Review, and said: "The action may seem
novel, but there can be no question about the plaintiff's right
to relief, irrespective of the amount of damages he might
recover at law (citing Schuyler v. Curtis, supra). If a person
can be compelled to submit to have his name and profile put
up in this manner for public criticism, to test his popularity
with certain people, he could be required to submit to the
same test as to his honesty, or morality, or any other virtue or
vice he was supposed to possess. Such a wrong is not without
its remedy. No newspaper or institution, no matter how
worthy, has the right to use the name or picture of any one
for such a purpose without his consent .... Private rights must
be respected, as well as the wishes and sensibilities of people.
When they transgress the law, invoke its aid, or put themselves up as candidates for public favor, they warrant criticism,.
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and ought not to complain of it; but where they are content
-with the privacy of their homes, they are entitled to peace bf
mind and cannot be suspended over the press-heated gridiron
of excited rivalry and voted for against their will and protest."
The case of Schuyler v. Curtis was urged in argument in the
principal case, but was dismissed by the court with the remark
that it was not in point-that the right of publication was not
there in question.
Indeed, this view seems to be borne out by the words of
Ingraham, J., (30 Abb. N. C. 376): " Nor does the act of
these defendants come within the provision of the State Constitution which secures to each citizen the right to freely speak,
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects. The defendants can freely speak, write and publish their sentiments as to
Mrs. Schuyler without exhibiting her statue to the public."
It would seem a trifle difficult to distinguish, in principle,
betv-.een the erection of this statue, ano.the printing of a portrait in a newspaper. Should this last be regarded as within the
privileges secured by the "freedom of the press?"
In .11arks v. Jaffa (supra), apparently, the point was not
raised.
if the publication of a portrait can be restrained, why not,
also, a printed description of a person or of his life ?
But this further step, the court, in the principal case, refused to take.
It remains to consider the two grounds for this refusal.
First, equity will only intervene in cases where property
rights are concerned. An injunction will not be issued to restrain even a libelous publication.
This proposition is supported by a long list of authorities:
Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. Rep. 773 ; Boston D. Co. v. Florence,
I14 Mass. 69 ; Whitehead Co. v. Kitson, I 19 Mass. 484; N.
Y Juvenile, etc., Co. v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly, 188; JlAaugher v.
Dick, 55 H. Pr. 132 ; L]4e Assn. v. Boogher, 3 Mo. Ap. 173 ;
Southey v. Sher-wood, 2 Mer. 435; Gee v. Pritchard, 2
Swanst. 402; Aulkern v. Vard, L. R. 13 Eq. 619; Lawrence v. Smith, Jacob. 471 ; Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Ed. Ch.
(N. Y.) 515 ; Fisherv. Apollinaris Co., L. R. io Ch. 297;
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PrudentialIns. Co. v Knott, Io Ch. Ap. 142 ; Mayer et al. v..
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 20 Atl. 492 (N. J., 189o ) ;
Townshend on Slander and Libel, 4 th Ed. 417 a., et. seq.,
and notes, with cases there cited; High on Injunctions, 3 d
Ed., § o15 ; Kerr on Ijunctions, *502.
The English cases to the contrary, have either been disapproved by later decisions, or else seem to be based upon
special statutory provisions, extending the jurisdiction of the
court of chancery. See Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 488;
Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551 ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Knott (supra); Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v.
Masam, 14 Ch. Div. 763; Thomas v. Williams, Id. 864;
Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. Div. 316; Bradley, J., in Kidd v.
Horry (supra).
The case of Croft v. Richardson, 59 H. Pr. 356, where an
injunction was issued against the publication of a trade-libel,
seems to stand alone, and is based upon insufficient authority.
In Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige, 24, the court said: " The
utmost extent the court of chancery has ever gone in restraining any publication, has been upon the principle of protecting the right of property." Since Schuyler v. Curtis and
Marks v. Jaffa, this is no longer true; those cases have furnished precedents, if no more.
The court in Singer Co. v. Domestic Co., 49 Ga. 70, stated
the law in clear and unmistakable terms:
"The general rule is that to get an injunction you must
show the infringement of a property right. It is well settled
that an injuncion will not be granted to restrain slander or libel
of title or reputation : 6 Simm. 297; II Beav. 112; II
Simm. 582. Not that it is not wrong, not that the wrong
might not be irreparable, but simply because courts of chancery, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers lodged in
them, have uniformly refused to act in such a case, leaving
parties to their remedy at law. Equity, it must be remembered, will not enjoin every wrong. There are injuries done
by one man to another which no law will remedy. Telling
lies, unless those lies be of a peculiar character, is one of such
injuries. But there are very many wrongs, wrongs recogniza-
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ble and capable of redress at law, that yet are not such
wrongs as a court of equity will enjoin. Libel and slander,
however illegal and outrageous, will not be enjoined. This is
the settled rule. It is true that courts of equity constantly
refuse to lay down any absolute limitation to their power to
issue this writ. But this only means that cases coming within
the principles on which the court has long acted, are not
beyond its power simply because the facts are novel or the
injury peculiar. The principle is, that to authorize the writ
there must be an irreparable, expected injury to property right."
Such language prompts a fear that the doctrine of the principal case is the true one, that the mere absence of any other
remedy is not enough to warrant the intervention of equity,
and that the New York courts, in their desire to accomplish a
salutary purpose, have overstepped the legitimate bounds of
their jurisdiction, and entered the political field.
Turning to the other ground of Judge Colt's opinion, the
question is whether the constitutional protection of the "freedom of the press " presents an insuperable obstacle to the use
of the injunction to restrain publications.
A collection of the provisions of the various State Constitutions will be found in Cooley's Constitutional L'mitations, 510,
n. I. That of New York, Art. I, § 8, is typical: " Every
person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and
no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press."
There can be no question that the real motive for the insertion of such provisions in the various constitutions, as in that
of the United States, was to prevent a political censorship of
the press, to leave all matters of public interest and importance
open for free discussion, and not to force upon private
individuals a distasteful publicity at the hands of gossiping
newspapers, leaving them to the very cold comfort of an
action at law for damages.
See Conn. v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304; Respublita v. Dennie,
4 Yates, 267 ; Jones v. Townsend, 21 Fla. 431.
If the existence of the legal right to privacy be granted, then
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this constitutional provision, literally construed, must make
justice a mockery in many instances ; for it is obvious that the
only possible safeguard against unwarrantable publications is
by way of prevention, and that for most of them, damages
would be no recompense at all, even if a court of law had
power to award such damages.
Yet, there stands the provision, and, thus far, it has not
been explained away.
In Marks v. Jaffa (supra), the constitutional question seems
to have been ignored; in Schuyler v. Curtis (supra), it was
avoided by a strict interpretation of the word "publication;"
while in the' principal case it furnished a conclusive argument
against the granting of the relief sought for.
A decision from the court of some other State will be
S. D. M.
awaited -ith great interest.

